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Abstract
The 2019 UK general election took place against a background of rising online
hostility levels toward politicians, and concerns about the impact of this on
democracy, as a record number of politicians cited the abuse they had been receiving
as a reason for not standing for re-election. We present a four-factor framework in
understanding who receives online abuse and why. The four factors are prominence,
events, online engagement and personal characteristics. We collected 4.2 million
tweets sent to or from election candidates in the six week period spanning from the
start of November until shortly after the December 12th election. We found abuse in
4.46% of replies received by candidates, up from 3.27% in the matching period for the
2017 UK general election. Abuse levels have also been climbing month on month
throughout 2019. Abuse also escalated throughout the campaign period. Abuse
focused mainly on a small number of high profile politicians, with the most
prominent individuals receiving not only more abuse by volume, but also as a
percentage of replies. Abuse is “spiky”, triggered by external events such as debates,
or certain tweets. Some tweets may become viral targets for personal abuse. On
average, men received more general and political abuse; women received more sexist
abuse. Conservative candidates received more political and general abuse. We find
that individuals choosing not to stand for re-election had received more abuse across
the preceding year.
Keywords: UK general election; Online abuse; Cyber-bullying; Twitter; Politics
1 Introduction
Following the announcement of the UK parliamentary election, held in December 2019,
a striking number of UK MPs, mostly women, cited the abuse and hostility they had
been receiving in the course of their work as a factor in their decision not to stand for
re-election [1]. This brought concerns about representation to the forefront; a political
environment increasingly regarded as hostile and even dangerous may differently impact
different sections of the community. The impact of social media on politics is also a cause
for concern, not only with regards to incivility but also disinformation and polarisation [2].
Dialogue on the subject takes the form of media [3] and government engagement [4], re-
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search effort and innovation from the platforms [5]. Yet there is muchwork still to be done
in understanding the causes of online toxicity and in forming an effective response.
In 2016, the UK voted to withdraw from the European Union in a close referendum that
left parliament, as well as the nation, divided. In the context of heightened national feelings
regarding “Brexit”, it will come as no surprise to many that online abuse toward politicians
in the UK has increased ([6] and below), with strong feelings on both sides of the fence.
Yet this is only one factor in the abuse we saw towards politicians in connection with the
election. In this work we propose the following heuristic framework for understanding
the abuse politicians receive on Twitter, which is discussed in more detail in the findings
section below:
• Prominence: First and foremost, attention and therefore abuse focuses on a limited
number of individuals most in the public eye.
• Event surge: Secondly, events may result in a surge in attention/hostility toward
particular individuals—for example a political event or a media appearance.
• Engagement: Thirdly, an opinionated tweet by a politician provides a focus for any ill
feeling towards their viewpoint or them as individuals that may be present on the
Twitter platform.
• Identity: Fourthly, politics, gender, ethnicity and other personal factors affect the
opinions that individual may express without incurring abuse (“norm violations” [7]
or political intimidation) as well as the form that abuse is likely to take.
This study draws on longitudinal data spanning the general election in 2019 and also
the previous UK general election in 2017. Using natural language processing, we identify
abuse and the recipient of the abuse, and type it according towhether it is political or sexist
abuse, or abuse of any kind. This enables a large-scale quantitative investigation. The con-
text of the general election and the event-rich nature of a campaign provide opportunities
to test the robustness of observations acrossmultiple similar contexts.Work of this nature
is strengthened by comparing findings across multiple periods, in which factors such as
events and individuals have changed, demonstrating the robustness of generalisations.
The main contributions of the paper are threefold. Firstly, we present evidence that on-
line abuse toward UK politicians is rising, and quantify this. We then present findings
organised in terms of illustrating the above framework, beginning with the way abuse dis-
tributes itself among individuals and moving on to the way events produce variation in
this, the tweets likely to precipitate out abuse, and finally the way genders and political
parties are treated differently, with reference also to the broader picture of discrimina-
tion against groups. Finally, we present the first comparison of the abuse towardMPs who
chose to stand again vs. those who chose not to, in order to inform the topic of how abuse
affects political careers and therefore, ultimately, representation.
Warning In describing our work, we make use of strong, offensive language and slurs.
This may be distressing for some readers.
2 Related work
As the effect of abuse and incivility in online political discussion has come to the fore in
public discussion, the subject has begun to be seriously investigated by researchers [8, 9].
Binns and Bateman [10] review Twitter abuse towards UK MPs in early 2017. Gorrell et
al. [11] compare similar data from both the 2015 and 2017 UK general elections. Ward
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et al. [12] explore a two and a half month period running from late 2016 to early 2017.
Greenwood et al. [13] extends work presented byGorrell et al. [11] to span four years. This
study is the first of its kind to incorporate the 2019 UK general election. In the political
sphere, findings are affected by the events of the time, which unfold over years, making it
hard to draw general conclusions. By situating the exploration of the four factors in this
new recent context, yet drawing on earlier work, we are able tomake amuch stronger case
than can be achieved with an isolated, shorter study.
Women and ethnic minority MPs say that they receive worrying abuse [14], and abuse
toward women has emerged as a topic of particular concern [8, 15–17]. Pew [18] find
that women are twice as likely as men to receive sexist abuse online, and are also more
likely to perceive online abuse as a serious problem. Gorrell et al. [6] present findings for
the first three quarters of 2019, with an emphasis on racial and religious tensions in UK
politics. They find ethnic minority MPs, in addition to receiving more racist abuse, also
receive more sexist abuse, and that women receive more sexist abuse. Rheault et al. [8]
find incivility toward women politicians increases with visibility, which they suggest re-
lates to the extent of gender norm violations. Broadly speaking, the emerging picture is
one in which women in politics are generally treated somewhat more politely than men,
but within that, subjected to a lesser but more sinister volume of misogyny specific to
them, and that women reasonably feel more distressed by the abuse they receive. In this
context, our quantitative contribution on the subject of how receiving abuse interacts with
choosing to stand for re-election is pertinent.
Gorrell et al. [2, 19] highlight the greater vocality of the pro-Brexit group on Twitter
during the 2016 EU membership referendum, a group that tends to be associated with
the (centre right) Conservative party. Similarly Vidgen et al. [20] explore UK far-right
Islamophobia on Twitter. Yet Gorrell et al. [6] find that generally speaking, UK Conser-
vative politicians are attracting more abuse on Twitter, a finding supported by earlier
work [11]. Such findings show that no one side of the political spectrum is silenced in the
UK. However, in other countries, political intimidation can be a much bigger problem.
Chaturvedi [21] describes India’s state-sponsored online intimidation operation from the
inside. A body of work describes how online intimidation is used to silence political op-
ponents in various countries (e.g. [22, 23]).
The quantitative work presented here depends on automatic detection of abuse in large
volumes of Twitter data. A significant amount of work exists on the topic of automatic
abuse detection within the field of natural language processing, often in the context of
support for platform moderation. Schmidt and Wiegand [24] provide a review of prior
work and methods, as do Fortuna and Nunes [25]. Whilst unintended bias has been the
subject of much research in recent years with regards to making predictive systems that
do not penalize minorities or perpetuate stereotypes, it has only just begun to be taken up
within abuse classification [26]; unintended bias, such as an increased false positive rate
for certain demographics, is a serious issue for sociological work such as ours. For that
reason and others we adopt a rule-based approach here, as discussed below.More broadly,
a biased dataset is one in which it is possible to learn classifications based on features
that are unconnected to the actual task. Wiegand et al. [27] share performance results
for several well known abuse detection approaches when tested across domains, giving a
more accurate impression of the state of the art with regards to actual abuse detection.
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3 Corpus andmethods
Our work investigates a large tweet collection on which a natural language processing has
been performed in order to identify abusive language, the politicians it is targeted at and
the topics in the politician’s original tweet that tend to trigger abusive replies, thus enabling
large scale quantitative analysis. It includes, among other things, a component forMP and
candidate recognition, which detects mentions of MPs. Topic detection finds mentions
in the text of political topics (e.g. environment, immigration) and subtopics (e.g. fossil
fuels). The list of topics was derived from the set of topics used to categorise documents
on the gov.uk website [28], first seeded manually and then extended semi-automatically
to include related terms and morphological variants using TermRaider [29], resulting in
a total of 1046 terms across 44 topics. This methodology is presented in more detail by
Greenwood et al. [13], with supporting materials also available online, as indicated at the
end of the paper. However abuse detection has been extended since previous work, and is
therefore explained in the next section.
3.1 Identifying abusive texts
A rule-based approach was used to detect abusive language. An extensive vocabulary list
of slurs, offensive words and potentially sensitive identity markers forms the basis of the
approach. The slur list contained 1081 abusive terms or short phrases in British andAmer-
ican English, comprising mostly an extensive collection of insults, racist and homophobic
slurs, as well as terms that denigrate a person’s appearance or intelligence, gathered from
sources that include http://hatebase.org and Farrell et al. [30].
Offensive words such as the “F” word don’t in and of themselves constitute abuse, but
worsen abuse when found in conjunction with a slur, and become abusive when used with
an identity term such as “black”, “Muslim” or “lesbian”. Furthermore, a sequence of these of-
fensive words in practice is abusive. 131 such words were used; examples include “f**king”,
“sh*t” and “fat”. Similarly, identity words aren’t abusive in and of themselves, but when used
with a slur or offensive word, their presence allows us to type the abuse. 451 such words
were used. Word lists are available online, as discussed in “Availability of data and materi-
als” below.
On top of these word lists, 53 rules are layered, specifying how theymay be combined to
form an abusive utterance as described above, and including further specifications such as
how to mark quoted abuse, how to type abuse as sexist or racist, including more complex
cases such as “stupid Jew hater” and what phrases to veto, for example “polish a turd” and
“witch hunt”, that a naive application of the lists would find abusive. Making the approach
more precise as to target (whether the abuse is aimed at the politician being replied to or
some third party) was achieved by rules based on pronoun co-occurrence. In the best case,
a tight pronoun phrase such as “you idiot” or “idiot like her” is found, that can reliably be
used to identify whether the target is the recipient of the tweet or a third party. Longer
range pronoun phrases are less reliable but still useful. However, large numbers of insults
contain no such qualification and are targeted at the tweet recipient, such as for example,
simply, “Idiot!”. Unless these are plurals, we count these. The approach is generally suc-
cessful, but where people make a lot of derogatory comments about a third party in their
replies to a politician, for example racist remarks about others, there may be a substantial
number of false positives.
Data from Kaggle’s 2012 challenge, “Detecting Insults in Social Commentary” [31], was
used to evaluate the success of the approach. The training set was used to tune the terms
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included. On the test set, our approachwas shown to have an accuracy of 80%, and a preci-
sion/recall/F1 of 0.72/0.47/0.57. This precision is considered sufficient for empirical work
(being greater than 0.7 [32]). However there is a long tail of linguistically more complex
abuse that is hard to identify with sufficient precision, and therefore recall is low. As a rule
of thumb, the method finds about half of the abuse. Therefore the results can be seen as
an indicator of a more pervasive problem.
To compare this to the current state of the art, we refer to Wiegand et al. [27], who
demonstrate that data-driven classification approaches leverage bias in the dataset to ob-
tain an inflated result. The median F1 they find for a set of well-known systems, tested
across domains to reduce this bias, is 0.617, showing that our performance is in keeping
with the current state of the art. Furthermore our approach carries a much reduced risk of
unwanted bias, such as more false positives for ethnic minorities or women [33–35], that
might reduce confidence in the findings presented here, since we don’t use indiscriminate
features.
The resulting system is publicly available, as discussed below under “Availability of data
and materials”.
3.2 Collecting tweets
The corpus was created by collecting tweets in real-time using Twitter’s streaming API.
We began immediately to collect any candidate who had been entered into Democracy
Club’s database [36] who had Twitter accounts. Some of these are members of the pre-
vious parliament who are standing for re-election, or for other reasons are well-known
politicians, and others were not members of the previous parliament, and possibly have
little in the way of a previous public profile. We used the API to follow the accounts of all
candidates over the period of interest. This means we collected all the tweets sent by each
candidate, any replies to those tweets, and any retweets either made by the candidate or of
the candidate’s own tweets. Note that this approach does not collect all tweets which an
individual would see in their timeline, as it does not include those in which they are just
mentioned. We took this approach as the analysis results are more reliable due to the fact
that replies are directed at the politician who authored the tweet, and thus, any abusive
language is more likely to be directed at them. Data were of a low enough volume not to
be constrained by Twitter rate limits.
3.3 Corpus
A total of 4,192,027 tweets were collected for the 2019 six-week period, comprising
184,014 original (authored) tweets from 2581 individual politicians, 334,952 retweets by
them, 131,292 replies by them and 3,541,844 replies to them. Table 1 gives the party and
gender breakdown of the individuals.We can see that aside from in the Labour party, men
were better represented.
Additionally we utilised matching data collected in the campaign period of the 2017
UK general election. Corpus statistics for that election can be found in Gorrell et al. [11].
The data was analysed using the same (updated since then) version of the abuse detection
application described in this work.
4 Findings
We proceed with an overview of the election, providing a landscape of environmental
factors affecting all candidates.
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Table 1 Sample statistics for the individuals studied. All candidates for the UK 2019 parliamentary
election are included, where we were able to obtain a Twitter account for them
Party Female Male Non-binary Total Not male
Labour Party 310 275 1 586 53.07
Conservative Party 162 367 0 529 30.62
Liberal Democrats 168 352 1 521 32.44
Green Party 150 211 2 363 41.87
The Brexit Party 43 153 0 196 21.94
Independent 23 86 0 109 21.10
Scottish National Party 20 39 0 59 33.9
Plaid Cymru 8 22 0 30 26.67
Other 50 138 0 188 26.60
Total 934 1643 4 2581 36.38
Table 2 Number of tweets, retweets and replies by candidates are given, alongside replies received,
of which abusive, and the percentage thereof. The first line shows findings for the six week election
campaign period. The second line contrasts this with the corresponding period for the 2017 UK
general election
Period Original
MP tweets
MP retweets MP replies Replies
to MPs
Abusive replies
to MPs
% abusive
3 Nov–15 Dec 2019 184,014 334,952 131,292 3,541,769 157,844 4.46
29 Apr–9 Jun 2017 126,216 245,518 71,598 961,413 31,454 3.27
4.1 Online abuse toward politicians is increasing
Table 2 gives overall statistics of the corpus. 3,541,769 replies to politicians were found,
of which abuse was found in 4.46%. The second row gives statistics for the matching 2017
general election period, allowing comparison to be made. It is evident that the level of
abuse received by political candidates has risen in the intervening two and a half years, a
change which is statistically significant (p < 0.001, Fisher’s exact test).
In Fig. 1 we show abuse received per month by individuals who are running for elec-
tion in 2019, alongside that received by individuals who were MPs in the previous parlia-
ment (“outgoing”, thoughmany will be re-elected).a OutgoingMPs who are standing again
therefore appear in both columns. Most abuse is received by a handful of these prominent
individuals appearing in both columns, so naturally they are similar, but showing both al-
lows us to contextualise and remove any doubt about the finding as regards the transition
at end of the period. The graph shows that abuse toward politicians by volume has risen
steeply across the year. As a percentage of replies received, there has been an increase of
around 1% as calculated on outgoing MPs. In November, candidates who aren’t previous
MPs are likely to have stepped up their engagement level, and outgoing MPs who aren’t
standing for re-election, the opposite, making it the only month where candidates receive
more abuse. In the previous months, we are counting abuse for individuals that are only
“candidates” in hindsight—they didn’t actually announce their candidacy until November.
Echoing the rise in percentage of abuse seen on longer timescales, across the six week
campaign period we see a rising level of abuse toward candidates, as shown in Table 3.
Figure 2 shows that for the majority of the period, this was due to rising abuse toward
Conservative candidates, which was not echoed in responses to either Labour or Liberal
Democrat candidates.b Twitter users have tended to show a bias toward the left of the po-
litical spectrum (see Gorrell et al. [37] for further discussion of the Twitter population) so
greater hostility toward Conservative candidates is not a surprise; however it is interesting
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Figure 1 Abuse by volume per month. Abuse received by candidates (including those standing for
re-election) alongside that received by outgoing MPs (not standing again) per month across 2019. Individuals
who are both previous MPs and candidates appear in both columns
Table 3 Tweet statistics on a per-week basis for the six week campaign period
Period Original
MP tweets
MP retweets MP replies Replies
to MPs
Abusive replies
to MPs
% abusive
Nov 3–Nov 9 18,633 40,683 14,456 464,473 17,854 3.84
Nov 10–Nov 16 19,845 40,110 14,651 444,045 20,742 4.67
Nov 17–Nov 23 30,445 57,764 19,372 547,748 22,007 4.02
Nov 24–Nov 30 35,254 62,688 23,674 572,976 27,666 4.83
Dec 1–Dec 7 37,615 65,601 24,237 590,781 28,151 4.77
Dec 8–Dec 14 42,222 78,106 34,902 921,746 41,421 4.49
to note that this rose in response to the campaign, suggesting an event-driven component.
The usual background up to that point had been more abuse by volume toward Labour
leader Jeremy Corbyn, as shown in Gorrell et al. [6], despite the Twitter bias. Politically
motivated abuse is discussed further below. In summary, there is compelling evidence that
online abuse toward politicians continues to increase both in volume and as a percentage
of replies.
4.2 Exploring the four factors
We organise our understanding of the abuse an individual receives around four factors as
introduced at the beginning of the paper; prominence, event surge, Twitter engagement
and personal identity factors. Earlier work by Gorrell et al. [11] uses structural equation
modelling to demonstrate that attracting attention on Twitter follows from being in the
public eye, but abuse received exaggeratesTwitter attention, and that engagement onTwit-
ter relates positively with abuse received. The graph is repeated in Fig. 3 for convenience.
Solid arrows indicate statistically significant relationships.
That earlier work doesn’t explore the relative impact of prominence vs. events, both
being subsumed under “attention”, and only began to explore the effect of gender and eth-
nicity. Gorrell et al. [6] andAgarwal et al. [38] present investigations into the bursty, event-
focused nature of online attention/abuse. Findings here and in Gorrell et al. [6] begin to
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Figure 2 Abuse volume per party per week. Abuse received by volume for candidates of the three biggest
parties on a per week basis during the campaign period
Figure 3 Structural equation model from Gorrell et al. [11]. Structural equation model from Gorrell et al. [11]
shows how tweeting (“engagement”) and prominence (gauged from Trends search data) relate with receiving
tweets and receiving abusive tweets. Gender, party membership and ethnicity are also included as variables
build up a picture of the way identity groups are treated differently. We proceed taking
each factor in turn.
4.2.1 Factor 1:more prominent individuals receive disproportionately more abuse
Table 4 shows the ten most abused candidates across the period studied (November 3rd
up to and including December 15th). It is evident that abuse (and indeed online attention
generally) focuses itself predominantly on a handful of high profile individuals, with the
remainder diminishing rapidly into a long tail of those receiving little abuse. This conforms
to a Zipfian distribution [39], which exaggerates prominence.
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Table 4 Ten most abused candidates by volume
Name Abusive replies All replies % abusive % of total
Boris Johnson 34,256 565,396 6.06 21.70
Jeremy Corbyn 33,782 636,630 5.31 21.40
Matthew Hancock 12,156 186,543 6.52 7.70
Michael Gove 7255 82,240 8.82 4.60
David Lammy 6261 106,594 5.87 3.97
Jo Swinson 3819 110,533 3.46 2.42
James Cleverly 3571 58,856 6.07 2.26
Jacob Rees-Mogg 3342 48,311 6.92 2.12
Sajid Javid 3082 57,712 5.34 1.95
Diane Abbott 2262 52,279 4.33 1.43
Furthermore, Gorrell et al. [6] suggest that abuse may be more exaggeratedly dispro-
portionate than the already highly concentrated distribution of online attention (as evi-
denced by, for example, replies received). The Pearson correlation coefficient comparing
percentage of abusive replies received against total replies received in our data shows that
prominence (as gauged by replies received) correlates positively and highly significantly
with percentage of abuse (p < 0.001) with a correlation coefficient of 0.10. In other words,
a prominent politician can expect a much greater proportion of their Twitter replies to
be abusive, compared with a less well-known politician, who even after factoring out the
difference in volume of replies, is receiving a much more supportive response online.
4.2.2 Factor 2: events lead to abuse surges
In Fig. 4 we see the timeline up to and including December 14th for the seven candidates
who received the most abuse by volume. The two main party leaders, Jeremy Corbyn and
Boris Johnson, received the most abuse by far, as shown above. There is somewhat of an
increase across the period in abuse towardMr Johnson. Furthermore, prominent Conser-
vatives also receive significant levels of abuse.Michael Gove, a cabinet member previously
associatedwith the “Brexit” transition process, receives a prominent spike around the time
of the climate debate.Mr Johnson receives the highest spike before the election at the time
of the BBC Prime Ministerial Debate on December 6th, echoing a pattern discussed be-
low where television appearances lead to a spike in Twitter abuse toward Mr Johnson
but less so toward Mr Corbyn. It is clear that the general pattern is for abuse to arrive
in “spikes” [6, 38], and that events such as television appearances influence these spikes.
Other peaks arise from engagement on the part of candidates. On November 12th, both
Mr Johnson andMr Corbyn made a number of opinionated tweets emphasising their pri-
orities and the dangers of the opposition.Mr Johnson also shared the Conservative Party’s
first broadcast. Health Secretary Matthew Hancock engaged in critical dialogue with Mr
Corbyn on Twitter in mid-November on the subject of the national health service. Mr
Hancock’s December 9th peak arises from a tweet in which he accused Labour activists
of “aggressive intimidation”. Abusive responses questioned his credibility, in a way that
seemed less likely to occur had a Labour politician made the same complaint. The subject
of how remarks are coloured by the politics of the person who made them is taken up
below.
Figure 5 gives an hour-by-hour timeline of the two party leaders for the days surround-
ing the first television debate of the campaign, and shows a common pattern with later
campaign events, with a spike at the time of the actual event, particularly for Mr Johnson.
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Figure 4 Abuse timeline for most abused candidates. Abuse volume timelines for the seven candidates who
received the most abuse in total
Figure 5 ITV prime ministerial debate timeline. Per-hour timeline for the two participants covering the days
surrounding the November 19th ITV prime ministerial debate
(Further event timelines can be found online as discussed in the “Availability of data and
materials” section below.)
4.2.3 Factor 3: opinionated tweets precipitate abuse
We have seen above that high profile events in conjunction with a precipitating tweet pro-
duce the highest surges of abuse. We now focus more specifically on precipitating tweets,
particularly from individuals that aren’t normally the focus for such high levels of atten-
tion.
The period of November 28th and 29th was eventful, featuring two election-related tele-
vision events (theNovember 28th Channel 4 Climate Debate and theNovember 29th BBC
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Figure 6 London Bridge stabbing timeline. Per-hour timeline for the most abused individuals around the
London Bridge stabbing. The time of the incident is highlighted using a vertical line. The large peak prior to
the stabbing relates to the climate debate
Election Debate) and also encompassing an Islamist attack in which two people died. The
main event drawing fire on Twitter was Michael Gove’s attempt to participate in Boris
Johnson’s place on Thursday, and his subsequent attitude, expressed on Twitter, about be-
ing refused, resulting in the fourth highest abuse peak of the campaign, and by far the
highest peak for someone who isn’t either Mr Johnson or Mr Corbyn. Both Mr Gove and
Mr Johnson drew more abuse on Twitter on Thursday night than any of the actual partic-
ipants, who did not particularly come under fire.
The timeline in Fig. 6 shows that the large peak in abuse toward Michael Gove around
the time of the Thursday night climate debate, and the next-morning “echo”, dwarf any re-
sponse to the London Bridge stabbing the following afternoon. Qualitative investigation
of the data shows a great deal of personal abuse toward Mr Gove. The surge the follow-
ing morning demonstrates that the peak is not just caused by people watching events on
television and taking to Twitter to comment, but arises from the ensuing Twitter activity
(people responding to what they see in their timelines the next day), which relates to how
Twitter displays material. The tweet that Mr Gove wrote that received the most abusive
replies said “Tonight I went to Channel 4 to talk about climate change but Jeremy Corbyn
and Nicola Sturgeon refused to debate a Conservative #climatedebate”. The controversial
factual spin may have contributed to virality.c
Although appearing small in comparison to Mr Gove’s peak, the surge in abuse toward
Home Secretary Priti Patel is unusual. Two tweets drew more abuse to her than she usu-
ally receives. In the tweets she blames Labour government legislation for the release of
the attacker. The abuse she received is predominantly of a general nature, but political
(usually “tory ___”) and sexist (around half of which is “witch”) types appear prominently.
Terrorism is a controversial subject. A tweet by Labour’s shadow home secretary Diane
Abbott in this context on the theme of penal moderation is typical of tweets that lead to
an abusive response for her as a highly visible left-wing representative. The theme of tol-
erance towards those who have committed a crime is often a divisive issue between the
left and right of the political spectrum.
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Whilst opinionated tweets on inflammatory subjects draw attention, especially for
prominent figures, at times this doesn’t explain the level of abuse received. The most
abused tweet of the period as a percentage (counting only those with more than 100 abu-
sive replies in total) was by a new candidate simply announcing his candidacy in relatively
typical terms. Steve Barclay drew an extraordinary number of abusive responses with a
tweet relating Brexit to football, not usually an inflammatory subject. Social factors can
be a part of creating an unfavourable environment for someone’s input. Where this takes
the form of systematic adversity for an entire demographic group, democracy is compro-
mised. We explore this in the next section.
4.2.4 Factor 4: personal characteristics affect abuse
We continue an established line of research here regarding the way identity groups are
treated differently. Our work serves to highlight the ways in which discrimination was
alive and well in the 2019 UK general election, albeit the short duration of the study pe-
riod limits findings to only the strongest effects. Ethnic and religious minorities are un-
derrepresented and therefore it is not possible to acquire reliable statistics for so short a
time period comparing their experience to white candidates, but it is possible to see how
women/non-gender-conforming candidates’ experiences differ from men’s, these being a
larger (combined) sample. We also discuss discrimination on the grounds of politics in
this section.
Although we don’t present findings about the experience of ethnic minorities here, but
instead refer the reader to earlier work [6], we do make use of the ability of our approach
to identify racist abuse. To give some impressions of this, the racist abuse we detect targets
a wide range of races/nationalities, with the British, the English and the white receiving a
substantial proportion. Abuse towards the majority tends to be experienced as less offen-
sive, making it more socially acceptable and therefore more frequent. Furthermore some
of the racist abuse we detect forms part of a dialogue about race, and is often used to
make a point. However a minority is explicit, unpleasant racism, with ethnic minorities
and Muslims being the particular targets.
Sexism Whilst prominent individualsmay receive consistently high abuse levels amount-
ing to as much as 6 or 7% of their Twitter replies, on average male candidates received
1.28% abuse, and not male, 0.96%. This difference is not significant due to the short time
period studied, but in keeping with significant results reported in Gorrell et al. [6] and
Greenwood et al. [13]. Men received almost twice as much abuse focused on their pol-
itics, as Fig. 7 shows; on average they received 0.11% vs 0.07% for non-male candidates.
Again, the result was not significant but in keeping with Gorrell et al. [6]. Men received
half as much sexist abuse (0.02% vs 0.04; p < 0.001, Mann–Whitney). Men received more
racist abuse (0.02% vs 0.01%) but volumes are low, the result was not significant and Gor-
rell et al. didn’t find this.
We take the opportunity to illustrate in practical terms the abuse that different groups
are exposed to. Table 5 shows the most frequent abusive terms found across all types,
followed by the most frequent politically abusive terms. Finally we see the most frequent
sexist abusive terms.d Phrases that trip off the tongue may get to the top of these tables,
whereas the long tail may contain more diverse ways of expressing a sentiment cluster
that is harder for people to unite around words for. Religious and homophobic abuse are
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Figure 7 Political, sexist and racist abuse received by men vs. not men. Political, sexist and racist abuse
received by male vs. non-male candidates as a macro-averaged percentage of all replies received
Table 5 Most frequently found abusive terms for all abuse types and for political and sexist abuse,
alongside count for the whole corpus
All abuse terms Count Political abuse terms Count Sexist abuse terms Count
fuck off 8342 tory scum 284 witch 224
idiot 6766 remoaner 276 stupid woman 149
twat 4337 fuck off commie 113 you stupid woman 148
coward 2649 tory bullshit 108 stupid man 108
idiots 2632 tory twat 79 you stupid man 104
scum 2324 tory cunt 60 you silly man 101
cunt 2068 tory bastards 57 silly man 88
moron 1979 bloody tories 54 you silly woman 78
piss off 1866 tory shit 50 stupid boy 69
wanker 1390 fucking tory 49 silly boy 65
too rare in the short time frame to produce interesting results (and confounded by much
discussion of Boris Johnson’s quote “tank-topped bum boys”). Racism is in evidence but
being rare, is better discussed in the context of a larger data sample, as in our previous
work [6], where ethnic minority politicians are found to receive more racist and sexist
abuse.
Word clouds allow us to show more terms than just the top ten.e We can see from the
word cloud in Fig. 8 that sexist abuse towardmenwas counted and did occur in the corpus,
though specifically misandristic terms are not readily available for men (equivalents for
“witch”, “bint” etc., such as might be used against men by women, as opposed to between
men) Excluding those with fewer than 0.2% sexist replies and fewer than 50 sexist replies
overall, the candidates receiving the highest percentage of sexist abuse are given in Table 6,
and are all women. Jo Swinson received the most sexist abuse of any candidate in this
period, although by volume, Boris Johnson was not far behind with 351 items; for him,
however, that only constituted 0.08% of all replies received.
In summary, findings support previous work suggesting that women receive more sexist
abuse and men receive more general and political abuse. In other words, as a female can-
didate you are likely to be treated somewhat more politely online, but when you do receive
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Figure 8 Word cloud for sexist abuse terms. Word cloud displaying the abuse terms most frequently found in
tweets containing sexist abuse
Table 6 Individuals receiving more than 0.2% sexist abuse and at least 50 sexist items in total
Name Sexist abuse All replies % sexist
Jo Swinson 464 110,533 0.42
Diane Abbott 202 52,279 0.39
Caroline Lucas 165 26,941 0.61
Jess Phillips 123 56,781 0.22
Priti Patel 122 39,616 0.31
Anna Soubry 102 30,912 0.33
Yvette Cooper 58 11,360 0.51
Margaret Hodge 50 4915 1.01
abuse the likelihood is much greater than for a man that this will focus on your body, not
your politics.
Political abuse Earlier work [6, 11, 13] has shown that in recent years, Conservatives
have tended to receive more online abuse on Twitter in the UK, a fact that may be related
to the demographics of the Twitter-using population. At the same time, Gorrell et al. [2]
also note the more vocal “leave” voice (associated with Conservative politics) around the
time of the UK EU membership referendum, and the greater abuse level by volume re-
ceived by Labour (centre left) leader Jeremy Corbyn, showing that political intimidation is
not emanating exclusively from one end of the political spectrum. There is relatively little
concern therefore about systematic silencing of opposition in the UK. This may not apply
in other countries, however, or on other platforms, and therefore in exploring how ideo-
logical bias affects abuse, it is with an awareness of the potential for a much more serious
problem. We saw above the most common terms of political abuse; Fig. 9 gives the word
cloud.
During the time period studied, we found that, as previously, Conservative candidates
receivedmore general abuse (1.9% vs. 1.14%, p < 0.001, Fisher’s exact test) andmore polit-
ical abuse (0.22% vs. 0.08%, p < 0.001). They also received more sexist abuse despite their
lower non-male representation (0.05% vs. 0.03%, p < 0.01).
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Figure 9 Word cloud for political abuse terms. Word cloud displaying the abuse terms most frequently found
in tweets containing political abuse. “F**k off” appears because it commonly occurs with political abuse
Exploring the topics that attracted abuse offers a way to understand political abuse in
more detail. The top nine topics mentioned by candidates in their tweets for each party
are shown in Fig. 10, with the remainder in the “other” category (long tail). Topics appear
in alphabetical order, both in the key and in the columns, which helps with identifying
the topics. In the lower part of the figure we see what topics attracted abusive responses
when mentioned by candidates in their tweets (i.e. the topic mentions were not in the
abusive tweets themselves, but in the replied-to tweets). The figure shows that not all
topics attract these responses equally. Defence and armed forces, Brexit, environment,
tax and revenue, national security (terrorism), borders and immigration, and democracy
are all subjects that tended to draw an elevated level of abuse for all parties (p < 0.001,
Fisher’s exact test). Compared with those levels of abuse expected for a particular topic,
we find that Conservative candidates particularly drew abuse when they talked about the
environment (7.69% vs typical 5.18%, p < 0.001), which may arise from responses to the
climate debate, discussed below. Scotland, democracy, Brexit, antisemitism and Europe
are also topics that drew a notably elevated number of abusive responses when discussed
byConservative candidates (t < 0.001), in addition to a number of other topicswhere abuse
was significantly elevated but less strikingly so in absolute terms.
Labour party candidates drew an elevated level of abuse when they talked about tax
and revenue (6.28% vs typical 5.07%, p < 0.001). Employment, and business and enterprise
were also notable in this regard for Labour (p < 0.001) in addition to other subjects where
abuse was significantly elevated but less strikingly in absolute terms or less significantly
so. For the Liberal Democrats, it is interesting to note that despite their strong focus on
Brexit, they didn’t particularly attract abuse on the subject. Their stance on social equality
drew more fire, with community and society attracting 4.18% abusive replies compared
with a typical 3.75% (p < 0.001).
4.3 MPs who stood down had receivedmore abuse
Twelve Conservative or formerly ConservativeMPs stated opposition to the party’s Brexit
policy as the precipitating factor for their standing down. Three Labour or former Labour
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Figure 10 Campaign topics per party, discussed vs. abused. In the top part of the figure, the nine topics most
mentioned in tweets by candidates of each party are shown in a stacked bar chart of tweet counts, with
remaining topics in the “other” category. In the lower part, in the same order, topics are counted according to
abusive replies they drew. For example, we see that the Brexit section is considerably larger in the lower part
of the figure for Conservative candidates, indicating that when they mention Brexit they tended to draw more
abuse. On the other hand, when they mentioned community and society they drew less abuse
MPs cited concerns about the climate or leadership of the Labour Party. Additional to this,
furtherMPs standing down, such as Louise Ellman, have had rocky relationshipswith their
party, which affected their decision to stand again [40]. Their rebel status might be a con-
tributing factor to the abuse they received. Of 76MPs that chose not to stand again, 27 had
some form of interrupted relationship with their original party. Of 21 Conservative MPs
suspended from the party in September 2019, 12 chose not to stand again. Eight Labour
Party MPs left to join Change UK earlier in the year, along with three Conservative MPs;
of these, four chose not to stand again. OtherMPs had interrupted relationships with their
party for a variety of reasons, including resignations and suspension for personal conduct.
26 of 53 MPs with interruptions in their party relationship, excluding both incoming and
outgoing speakers, chose not to stand again; a very much elevated proportion compared
with 76 of a total 650 overall.
However several have also explicitly referred to abuse as the reason or one of their rea-
sons for standing down, for example Nicky Morgan [41], Caroline Spelman [42], Teresa
Pearce [43], Heidi Allen [44] and Mark Lancaster [45].
In Fig. 11 we directly compare average abuse per month received by MPs who chose
not to stand again against those who did choose to stand again. We see that in all bar one
of the earlier months of the year those individuals on averagef received more abuse by
volume, and particularly in June (following from new party Change UK’s lack of success in
the European Parliament election). When considered as a percentage of replies received,
theMPs that stood down had on averagemore abuse than the ones that are standing again
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Figure 11 Volume of abuse per month, resigning MPs vs. standing. Macro-averaged abuse per month per
individual for those MPs who chose to stand again vs those who chose not to
Figure 12 Percentage abuse per month, resigning MPs vs. standing. Macro-averaged percentage abuse per
month per individual for those MPs who chose to stand again vs those who chose not to
in every single month of the year, as shown in Fig. 12. The difference in percentage abuse
is significant in a t-test at p < 0.01.
5 Conclusion
Between November 3rd and December 15th, we found 157,844 abusive replies to candi-
dates’ tweets (4.44% of all replies received)—a low estimate of probably around half of the
actual abusive tweets. Overall, abuse levels climbed week on week in November and early
December, as the election campaign progressed, from 17,854 in the first week to 41,421
in the week of the December 12th election. Abuse also increased month on month to a
total increase of over 1% over the course of 2019. Taken alongside the 3.27% abuse found
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in replies to candidates for the matching period over the 2017 UK general election, there
is evidence that online abuse toward politicians is on the rise.
Twitter attention focuses disproportionately on the handful of most prominent politi-
cians. Furthermore, the distribution of abuse is evenmore disproportionate, with themost
prominent individuals receiving in excess of 6% abuse in their replies, compared with
a more typical 1% for the average candidate. The “bursty”, event-driven nature of abuse
is demonstrated here through being centred on the events of the campaign. However,
within the big picture of abuse being received by prominent politicians in conjunction
with prominent events, there is ample evidence of abuse varying in response to particular
tweets (“virality”, which may constitute bullying, and reaction to opinionated tweets) and
particular types of people. In the 2019 general election campaign, in keeping with previous
research [6], men received more general and political abuse, and women received more
sexist abuse.g Conservatives received more general and political abuse, as well as some-
what more sexist abuse. The personal nature of sexist abuse makes it a particular cause for
concern.
We also found that MPs that chose to stand down had consistently received more abuse
thanMPs that chose to run again over the course of the previous year. Reasons why a per-
son chooses to stand or not stand for election are many-factored, and causality is unclear,
but the fact that we have found a positive, statistically significant relationship between be-
ing subjected to an abusive tone on Twitter and choosing to stand down as an MP should
be a cause for concern. Taken together, these findings raise significant concerns regard-
ing the increasingly unpleasant climate surrounding politics and the effect that is likely to
have on political representation.
Social aspects of sexist and racist abuse make it complex to interpret, and our approach
to categorising this has been cautious in defining both broadly, to include abuse towards
themajority aswell asminority. Despite thiswe have found significant grounds for concern
about the discrimination politicians are subjected to. However details of the social context
make a difference to the harmcaused by hate speech, and an empirical study exploring how
terms are used within and across groups, for example between men, or by women to men,
may allow for greater specificity in future work.
Funding
This work was supported by the ESRC under grant number ES/T012714/1, “Responsible AI for Inclusive, Democratic
Societies: A cross-disciplinary approach to detecting and countering abusive language online.”
Availability of data andmaterials
Individual tweets cannot be shared due to the sensitive nature of identifying those who send abusive tweets to public
figures. However the system used to annotate the data is publicly available at
https://cloud.gate.ac.uk/shopfront/displayItem/gate-hate. Additional information about the system can be found at
https://gate-socmedia.group.shef.ac.uk/election-analysis-and-hate-speech/ge2019-supp-mat/. Aggregate data are
available at https://figshare.shef.ac.uk/articles/Which_Politicians_Receive_Abuse_/12340994 with a DOI of
https://doi.org/10.15131/shef.data.12340994.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Ethics approval was granted to collect the data through application 25371 at the University of Sheffield. All data used are
in the public domain, and only public figures are identified by name in this work. Due to the sensitive nature of the data,
it cannot be made public except in aggregate. Experimenter exposure to disturbing material is managed through short
sessions. Readers are warned at the start of this work that they may find the language they encounter distressing.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
GG designed and performed the analysis, developed the abuse classifier and wrote the text. MEB wrote the software to
extract summary data from indexed tweets. IR managed the indexing of the raw tweets into our search engine. MAG
Gorrell et al. EPJ Data Science            ( 2020)  9:18 Page 19 of 20
helped to produce some of the figures. KB provided direction and guidance. All authors read and approved the final
manuscript.
Endnotes
a
The chart of abusive tweet count per month since January naturally doesn’t contain all candidates, since these were
only announced in November. It is based on our previous data collection, and contains only candidates that also
stood in 2017. However, considering most abuse/replies are received by the most prominent individuals, the
overlap is very high. 99% of abuse in the new dataset also appears in the old one (and 95% of replies). For the
calendar month of November, in the new dataset 94,566 abusive replies to candidates were found whereas the
graph shows 93,516.
b
Party disparity not due to greater engagement on Twitter by Conservative candidates. Tweets authored: Wk 1, Cons
11,311, Lab 19,965; Wk 2, Cons 10,921, Lab 19,648; Wk 3, Cons 15,404, Lab 25,973; Wk 4, Cons 19,065, Lab 33,468.
c
The high response level, e.g. vs. the terror attack the following day, is possibly a form of “bikeshedding”, i.e.
responding to the accessible rather than the important. Online culture has also explored the compelling power of
“someone on the Internet who is wrong” (e.g. see https://www.xkcd.com/386/).
d
Inclusion of terms is heuristic; various sources have been combined, and further terms added through observation
as the system has matured over several years. Yet there may be some terms we have overlooked despite our best
efforts.
e
If an abuse term of another type appears frequently with for example political abuse, it may appear in the word
cloud.
f
Macro-average: the figure is calculated per individual and then averaged, to avoid prominent individuals
dominating the overall result
g
The number of non-gender-conforming candidates was too small to draw conclusions from.
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